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The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control
Martin Gregor∗, Dalibor Roh´ aˇ c∗∗
Abstract We extend a model of wasteful state aid in Dewatripont and Seabright (2006, Jour-
nal of the European Economic Association 4, 513–522) by a supranational controlling authority.
The model combines moral hazard and adverse selection to show that politicians fund wasteful
projects to signal their effort. Voters, unable to observe project beneﬁts or effort, reward funding
with a reelection premium that separates a high-effort politician from a low-effort politician. We
examine state aid control by a benevolent authority which receives extra signals about the state
of the world. We ﬁnd that signals on the politician type are worthless. For signals on the project
type, we derive a sufﬁcient condition for aid control to unambiguously decrease welfare. We
also prove that politicians do not respond to marginal changes in incentives. In this setup, the
optimal state aid control is fairly often no control.
Keywords State aid, signaling, career concerns, aid control
JEL classiﬁcation D72, D78, D82, H25 ∗ ∗∗
1. Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the possibility and desirability of supranational control
of state aid in a framework where wasteful state aid serves as a signal of effort by
national politicians. Based on the assumption that state aid can be both proﬁtable or
wasteful, we examine why a supranational controller should not be willing to ban state
aid projects funded by the national authorities. We assume a benevolent controller,
hence the topic can be treated as an optimal ex post control problem. Our main result
isthatinthissetup, thecaseforthewelfare-improving stateaidcontrolisrathernarrow.
The costs and beneﬁts of state aid are topics of joint interest of international eco-
nomics, industrial organization, and political economy. In strategic trade theory, com-
petition of countries through state aid is seen as detrimental to welfare (Spencer and
Brander 1983; Krugman 1984; Dixit 1984; Eaton and Grossman 1986). There are
nonetheless signiﬁcant exceptions: With sufﬁcient product differentiation and Bertrand
and Cournot oligopoly, subsidies to domestic ﬁrms might be welfare enhancing if the
negative effect of subsidies on proﬁts of foreign ﬁrms can be outweighted by positive
effect on foreign consumer surplus (Collie 2005).
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From political economy point of view, the existence of asymmetric incentive to
lobby on part of the losers (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2007) also suggests that state
aid must involve a signiﬁcant share of wasteful projects. Empirically, there is indeed
anecdotal evidence stating that state and regional aids largely fail to take into account
the comparative advantage (Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman 2002).
Yet in the European Union, state aid in the form of direct transfers, equity parti-
cipation, debt conversion, tax deferrals, or loan guarantees is strictly regulated. Each
individual bailout must be approved by the EC Commission and the approval is condi-
tional on a set of criteria gathered in the “Community Guidelines on State Aid for Res-
cuing and Restructuring Firms in Difﬁculty” (Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union,
2004). In light of this, it is interesting that the proportion of negative decisions of the
European Commission during the 1990s amounted to less than 2 percent of all cases
under investigation (Besley et al. 1999).
We aim to show that, in a large set of circumstances, the optimal state aid con-
trol is indeed no control. We build on the signaling model of wasteful state aid in
Dewatripont and Seabright (2006). This is a single country model where a politician
exerts costly effort, and a representative voter lacks information on the aid beneﬁts and
the politician’s effort. Wasteful state aid then emerges as a signal of effort by which
a high-effort politician separates from a low-effort politician. The signal is however
costly for the voter since the high-effort politician — who is more likely reelected —
funds also wasteful projects, whereas the low-effort politicians funds only proﬁtable
projects. This contrasts to a dynamic framework in Casamatta and De Paoli (2007),
where the politician with a stronger taste for the public investment is less likely to
adopt a wasteful policy.
This line of reasoning follows classic career concern models of pre-electoral sig-
naling (cf., Persson and Tabellini 2000). Pre-electoral signaling dates back to Rogoff’s
(1990) political budget cycle. With lack of evidence on cycles in ﬁscal aggregates
(Brenden and Drazen 2008), recent research aims to restate the model away from to-
tal spending towards signaling through the structure of spending (Drazen and Eslava
2007, 2008). In the context of career concerns, another important variable serving as a
signal of the politician type is the volume of campaign spending (Roumanias 2005).
Technically, a very close setup to ours offers Gersbach (2004), where money-
burning reﬁnement (e.g., costly uninformative advertising) is applied to eliminate pool-
ing equilibria. Streb (2005) extends the setup by incomplete information on both com-
petence and opportunism (lack of honesty), whereby extra spending loses part of its
appeal as it serves as a signal of manipulation. Incentives remedying career concerns
through change in the candidate quality in a citizen-candidate framework have been
furthermore analyzed in Candel-Sanchez (2007), Poutvaara and Takalo (2007), and
Gersbach (2009).
In the context of industrial policy, an alternative model of wasteful pre-electoral
public investment is a model of ‘white elephants’ in Robinson and Torvik (2005). It
shows that in order to win elections, incumbent governments might undertake projects
with a negative surplus. The reason is that only the incumbent can credibly commit to
unproﬁtable projects, which creates an electoral advantage of extra constituency of the
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beneﬁciaries.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the setup. Section 3 derives
equilibria of the baseline case without aid control, including equilibria omitted in De-
watripont and Seabright (2006). On top of that, it discusses design of incentives aiming
at the elimination of waste. Section 4 introduces the state aid controller into the model
and proves the central results of the paper. Section 5 concludes.
2. The setup
Consider a politician providing state aid. The politician observes a pool of aid projects,
investigates into their cost-beneﬁt ratios, and decides on ﬁnancing. Suppose each
project costs c > 0, but projects differ in beneﬁt v ∈ {v,v}, where v < c < v, thus a
project is either wasteful or proﬁtable.
The politician has to invest effort to ﬁnd a proﬁtable project. More precisely, sup-
pose that the politician faces a menu of lotteries over proﬁtable and wasteful projects.
A lottery with a higher likelihood of a proﬁtable project is available at the cost of
higher effort than a lottery with a lower likelihood of the proﬁtable project. Speciﬁ-
cally, to ﬁnd a proﬁtable project with probability i ∈ [0,1], let the effort be y(i), where
y(0) = 0, yi > 0, yii > 0, and limi→1- y(i) = +¥, where the last term guarantees the
existence of an interior optimum of effort. Once effort is exerted, the corresponding
lottery is carried out, the politician observes true v, and ﬁnally determines whether to
fund the project (a = 1) or not (a = 0).
The politician pays entire cost c, but internalizes only a portion of the beneﬁt, av.
We assume two types of politicians with the rates of internalization a ∈ {a,a} that
are private information, where 0 < a < a < 1. We call the high-type H-politician,
and low-type L-politician. Effort and true (ex post) proﬁtability of the project are also
private information of the politician.
Timing is as follows: (0) Nature chooses H-politician with apriori probability p ∈
[0,1], and L-politician with probability 1− p. (1) The politician chooses lottery i, and
exerts effort y(i). (2) Nature chooses proﬁtable project with probability i, and wasteful
project with probability 1−i. (3) Upon realization of the lottery, the politician observes
v, and determines funding, a ∈ {0,1}. (4) A representative voter observes funding
choice and reelects.
Since the voter does not observe project type, effort, or politician type, only the
funding choice, there is just a pair of posterior beliefs of the voter: p0 = Pr(a = a|a =
0), and p1 = Pr(a = a|a = 1). The pair of re-election rates he or she selects is thus
(r0,r1) ∈ [0,1]×[0,1], where r0 applies in the case of no funding, and r1 in the case of
funding.
Since the setup is ﬁnite, let the continuation value of reelection for both politicians
be ﬁxed and positive, B > 0. This gives us that the politician’s infoset value in the case
of no funding is r0B, and in the case of funding writes av−c+r1B. For convenience,
we denote the funding function of H-politician as a(v) and the funding function of
L-politician as a(v).
Figure 1 illustrates the game tree. Given the voter’s limited way of making be-
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lief updates, this incomplete information game features no proper subgame, hence
any equilibrium can be characterized as a Bayesian equilibrium (possibly with reﬁne-
ments). Notice that, unlike in many retrospective voting models, the voter is not able
to commit to (pre-announce) a pair of reelection rates (r0,r1). If so, the voter as a
Stackelberg leader would select from a set of proper subgames, and perfectness would
have to be imposed.
Figure 1. Game tree (H: high-type politician, L: low-type politician, V: voter)
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3. Equilibria
3.1 Preliminaries
To understand incentives of politicians, notice that a politician has exactly two instru-
ments, effort and funding. Absent from reelection incentives, H-politician would use
both instruments at a socially more preferred level than L-politician: Effort would be
larger given the larger internalization of the beneﬁt, and funding choice would be efﬁ-
cient (proﬁtable projects funded, and wasteful projects stopped). With reelection, how-
ever, politicians additionally respond to a reelection premium for funding, (r1 −r0)B;
if positive, politicians have an extra incentive to fund.
Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) identify a wasteful semi-separating equilibrium,
characterized such that (i) L-politician exerts less effort than H-politician, but(ii)
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H-politician funds all projects, including wasteful ones, whereas L-politician funds
only proﬁtable projects, and (iii) the voter maintains a positive reelection premium that
induces wasteful spending as a signaling device of the high-type politician.
Thus, a tradeoff is associated with H-politician: The politician is able to access a
better lottery, yet — facing a better lottery — overfunds. He or she keeps unobserv-
able instrument (effort) at a socially more preferred level, but distorts the observable
instrument (funding). Distortion of an observable instrument is accepted by the voter
as long as the expected payoff from distortion compensated by better selection (as de-
livered by H-politician) exceeds expected payoff from non-distortion combined with
worse selection (as delivered by L-politician).
The setup where beneﬁts are uncertain, with uncertainty reducible by the politi-
cian’s effort, is not only relevant to the provision of state aid. It applies to virtually all
public policies where politician’s effort is necessary to avoid risk of funding a wasteful
project. Provision of state aid is only special due to the existence of a supranational au-
thority that corrects for external effects of national state aid. Thus, the semi-separating
equilibrium lends itself to a broad interpretation: Policy activism distinguishes compe-
tent governments, hence is a valuable signal, but also inevitably brings overspending
compared to the social optimum.
Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) describe this equilibrium only implicitly. For
comparative statics as well as the comprehensive analysis of the aid control, a full and
explicit description of all feasible Bayesian equilibria is a precondition. This is subject
of the following subsections.
3.2 The politicians’ best responses
From the infoset values in the funding nodes, where project type is disclosed to the
politician, it is straightforward that a politician’s decision to fund is represented by
av−c+r1B ≥ r0B. We apply this inequality when characterizing the politician’s
best response. Before that, we introduce Assumption 1 by which politicians’ valua-
tions are such that politicians do not completely separate. The reverse case (where
H-politician always internalizes more beneﬁts than L-politician) doesn’t directly fea-
ture the key tradeoff related to a high-type as suggested by Dewatripont and Seabright
(2006), hence is not analyzed in the paper. We can provide solution to this case upon
request.
Assumption 1 (Overlap). H-politician internalizes the beneﬁt of the low-value project
less than L-politician internalizes the beneﬁt of the high-value project, av > av.
Let r := r1 −r0 ∈ [−1,1] be the reelection rates difference, expressing the differ-
ence between reelection for a funding and non-funding politician. The value rB is to
be called reelection premium. Table 1 uses the politician’s optimal decision to fund to
characterize ﬁve subsets of the reelection rates r0,r1 (or, equivalently, ﬁve subintervals
of the reelection difference r):
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Table 1. Partition of the feasible reelection rates
F1 = {r0,r1 : av−c+rB ≤ 0}
F2 = {r0,r1 : av−c+rB < 0 ≤ av−c+rB}
F3 = {r0,r1 : av−c+rB < 0 ≤ av−c+rB}
F4 = {r0,r1 : av−c+rB < 0 ≤ av−c+rB}
F5 = {r0,r1 : 0 ≤ av−c+rB}
Throughout the paper, we assume that all subsets are feasible (Assumption 2). In
other words, the set of reelection premia is large enough to permit any funding choice
of any politician. A necessary condition for feasibility of all subsets is twofold: First,
the condition characterizing F1-set holds for the lowest reelection difference (r =
−1), where funding is maximally punished, (r0,r1) = (1,0). Second, the condition
characterizing F5-set holds for the largest reelection difference (r =1), where funding
is maximally rewarded, (r0,r1) = (0,1).
Assumption 2 (Feasible subsets). The game parameters (a,a,v,v,c,B) satisfy av−
c−B ≤ 0 ≤ av−c+B.
Our ﬁnal restriction on parameters states that the F1-set entirely belongs to the
subspace of a negative reelection premium, where rB = (r1−r0)B < 0, or r < 0. As
we will immediately see, this is equivalent to say that for a zero reelection difference,
at least H-politician funds the proﬁtable project. This assumption is entirely for the
sharpness of prediction in comparative statics.
Assumption 3 (Negative F1-set). Assume av−c > 0 to obtain (r0,r1) ∈ F1 : r < 0.
Given the subsets in Table 1, funding choices in the best responses of the politicians
are in Table 2. Notice in this context that Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) implicitly
restricted their investigation to the F4-set, disregarding the other best responses.
Table 2. The optimal funding choices of the politicians
Subset a(v) a(v) a(v) a(v)
F1 0 0 0 0
F2 0 0 0 1
F3 0 1 0 1
F4 0 1 1 1
F5 1 1 1 1
In addition to funding, the other politician’s instrument is effort. The optimal level
of effort depends on whether — facing reelection rates — it is optimal for the politician
to fund no project, only proﬁtable project, or both projects. The optimal effort is thus
subset-dependent, as Table 2 shows: L-politician funds no project on F1 and F2, single
project on F3 and F4, and both projects on F5. H-politician differs by funding single
project on F2, and both projects on F4. Clearly, given the larger internalization rate,
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H-politician funds relatively more than L-politician.
For no project funded, the optimal level of effort is obviously zero. For only a
proﬁtable project to be funded, the optimal effort satisﬁes for any a ∈ {a,a}:
i = argmax{i(av−c+r1B)+(1−i)r0B−y(i)} = y−1
i (av−c+rB)
For both projects to be funded, the optimal effort satisﬁes for any a ∈ {a,a}:
i = argmax{i(av−c+r1B)+(1−i)(av−c+r1B)−y(i)} = y−1
i (a(v−v))
Denote the optimal effort of H-politician as i(r), and the effort of L-politician
as i(r), and impose I := max{i} = i(1),I := max{i} = i(1). Figure 2 illustrates the
optimal levels of effort.
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The previous subsection derived best-responses of the politicians for all pairs of reelec-
tion rates. A necessary equilibrium condition is that the voter expecting the politicians’
best responses does not deviate from his or her reelection rates. Thus, equilibria are
identiﬁed simply by checking for deviations of the voter. To do so, Table 3 shows for
each subset if H-politician is preferred to L-politician in terms of effort, funding, and
overall. To get the table, we use funding choices in Table 2 and efforts in Figure 2. It
also shows whether a belief update over politician types is feasible. Based on the over-
all preference and possibility of update, we can conjecture whether the voter deviates
in terms of changing his or her reelection rates.
Table 3. When does the voter deviate?
Subset Effort Funding Overall Update Deviation
F1 H, L H, L H, L no no
F2 H H H p1 > p > p0 yes
F3 H H,L H p1 > p > p0 yes
F4 H L ambiguous p1 > p > p0 ambiguous
F5 H H,L H no no
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An important part of analysis in Table 3 is to check the voter’s posteriori beliefs.
Obviously, in F1 and F5-set, updates based on equilibrium choices are impossible,
since observable choices of both types are identical (for out-of-equilibrium posteriors,
see Proposition 1 below). For F2, F3, and F4-set, H-politician exerts strictly higher
effort, i(r) > i(r) (see Figure 2) and/or strictly higher funding choice. This yields that
the overall probability of funding by H-politician is strictly higher, hence funding is a
signal that reveals more likely to encounter H-politician, and the absence of funding
reveals more likely to encounter L-politician, p0 < p < p1.
To understand the voter’s best responses, recall that from the perspective of the
voter, to re-elect is to choose a lottery of politicians with posterior (p0,1− p0) if fund-
ing is not observed, respectively (p1,1− p1) if funding is observed. In contrast, not
to reelect means to select a lottery of politicians with the prior distribution (p,1− p).
Hence, if the belief update along equilibrium path leads to an improvement in infor-
mation (p0 6= p 6= p1), the voter strictly prefers either prior or posterior lottery, unless
he or she is exactly indifferent between the politicians. In other words, the voter is
indifferent between the lotteries if and only if (i) the belief update is not informative,
or (ii) he or she is indifferent between the politicians.
Ambiguity of the voter’s preference over types in F4-set deserves a closer look.
For the voter, denote the expected value of having H-politician in this set as
u(r) := i(r)(v−c)+(1−i(r))(v−c) = I(v−c)+(1−I)(v−c),
and the expected value of having L-politician as
u(r) := i(r)(v−c) > 0.
Notice that u(r) is constant in r, whereas u(r) grows in r, because L-politician is
incentivized by larger reelection premium, di(r)/dr > 0. To sum up, the relative
attractiveness of H-politician, u(r)−u(r), falls in r.
Due to monotonicity of the relative attractiveness of H-politician, we have a unique
cutoff value of the reelection difference, where the voter anticipating F4-funding is
exactly indifferent between the politicians. The cutoff value ˆ r satisﬁes u(ˆ r) = u(ˆ r).







Proposition 1 (Bayesian equilibria). If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then there exist two
sets of pooling equilibria:
1. No funding: (r0,r1)∈F1,a(v)=a(v)=0,v∈{v,v},i(r)=i(r)=0,p1 ∈[0,1]
2. Total overfunding with a(v) = a(v) = 1,v ∈ {v,v},i(r) = I,i(r) = I, where (i)
(0,r1) ∈ F5,p0 < p, (ii) (r0,r1) ∈ F5,p0 = p, and (iii) (1,r1) ∈ F5,p0 > p.
If an entire F4-set is feasible, then there exists a set of semi-separating equilibria
with a(v) = 0,a(v) = 1,a(v) = a(v) = 1 if and only if (r0,r0+ ˆ r) ∈ F4.
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Proof. First of all, feasibility of all sets deﬁned by Assumption 2 implies that equili-
brium is not in F2 or F3-set. From Table 3, we know that in both of these sets, the
voter strictly prefers a high-type politician, and both belief updates are informative
(p0 < p < p1), hence the best response of the voter writes (r0,r1) = (0,1), but this
pair of actions belongs to the F5-set. Note that in the F3-set, albeit funding choices
are identical, updates are still informative, because H-politician plays a better lottery,
i(r) > i(r), hence funds more frequently.
– Existence of pooling equilibrium in the F1-set: The posterior for a = 0 is p0 = p.
The voter is indifferent between the high-type and low-type politician because both
deliver the identical effort, i = i = 0, as well as identical funding, a(v) = a(v) =
0,v∈{v,v}. Asaresult, observing a=0, thevoter isindifferent between reelection
(i.e., a lottery with the high-type occurring with posterior p) and no reelection (i.e.,
a new draw with the high-type occurring with prior p), and r0 is restricted only by
belonging to the F1-set.
Out-of-equilibriumbelief p1 inthispoolingequilibriumisnotrestricted, p1 ∈[0,1],
because the voter observing out-of-equilibrium action a = 1 is still indifferent over
types, hence an informative posterior p1 doesn’t lead to a change in his or her
reelection rate r1.
– Existence of pooling equilibrium in the F5-set: The posterior for a = 1 played
along the equilibrium path is not informative (p1 = p), hence the voter setting r1
is indifferent between reelection (current lottery) and new election (new lottery).
Thus, r1 restricted only by belonging to the F5-set.
In contrast to the F1-equilibrium, however, the voter strictly prefers the high-type,
hence an informative out-of-equilibrium belief p0 6= p leads to a strict preference,
r0 = 0 or r0 = 1. Speciﬁcally, if p0 < p, we have to have r0 = 0; if p0 > p, there
must be r0 =1, and only for p= p0 is r0 restricted only by belonging to the F5-set.
– Sufﬁcient and necessary condition for semi-separating equilibria if an entire F4-set
is feasible: A semi-separating equilibrium is characterized by (i) F4-set and (ii) the
cutoff value of the reelection difference. As to (i), Table 2 shows that the F4-set
is a necessary condition for the politicians’ semi-separating best responses. As to
(ii): If r 6= ˆ r, the voter deviates to r = −1 or r = 1, but due to feasibility of a
full F4-set, none of this is in the F4-set. Thus, if F4-set is feasible, a sufﬁcient
and necessary condition for the existence of an interior semi-separating wasteful
spending equilibrium is that the cutoff value of a reelection difference falls exactly
in the F4-set. 2
Figure 3 depicts the equilibria in the space of re-election rates (r0,r1), with arrows
indicating the direction of the deviation of the voter. Shaded areas in F1 and F5 in-
dicate indifference. Notice that some of the pooling equilibria might be eliminated
by standard reﬁnements. Applying passive conjectures (out-of-equilibrium posteriors
set equal to priors), we eliminate subsets (i) and (iii) of the F5-pooling equilibria.
Exactly the same outcome brings a test for complete robustness (responses are best
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Figure 3. Bayesian equilibria and the voter’s deviations
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given all out-of-equilibrium beliefs): F1-equilibria are completely robust, whereas F5-
equilibria are robust only if p0 = p. Equilibrium dominance known as the intuitive cri-
terion (Cho and Kreps 1987) is not very helpful, because all pooling equilibria satisfy
the criterion. This is a property of feasibility of all sets in Assumption 2: It implies
that for both politicians, both funding choices a = 0 and a = 1 may appear in their best
responses. Hence, when setting out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the voter cannot rule out
any type of the politician on the basis of payoff dominance over an out-of-equilibrium
action.
Finally, by Assumption 3, we know that F1-pooling equilibria exist if and only if
politicians expect an extra reward from the absence of funding, r0B>r1B. This may be
used as a further reﬁnement on the F1-pooling equilibria: Since a voter gets nothing in
the F1-equilibrium, it is very unlikely that he or she tends to coordinate on a perverse
incentive of strictly rewarding the absence of funding, r0 > r1.
3.4 Comparative statics
In the model, one of the key question is whether accountability remedies wasteful
spending or not. Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) argue that improvements in ac-
countability do not address overfunding, rather exacerbate the career concerns of the
politicians. This is a strong statement given the evidence on the high levels of public
investments in countries with less competitive elections, hence lower accountability
(Keefer and Knack 2007).
In formalizing this intuition, it is useful to examine two measures shaping incen-
tives of the politicians, both arguably available to the voter — a change in the project
cost c the politician pays (i.e., compensating or punishing the politician for funding),
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and an increase in the value of reelection B. Given the large population size, we may
consider both changes costless for a representative voter, and focus only on the beneﬁts
involved.
To start with, recall Table 1 where the ﬁve F-sets are deﬁned by four boundaries,
satisfying r := r1−r0 = (c−av)/B,v ∈ {v,v},a ∈ {a,a}. This helps us to identify
the location of the equilibria sets, F1, F4, and F5.
By Assumption 1 and the starting assumptions of project and politician types, we
have av > av > av > av. Inserting into the deﬁnition of the wasteful project, v < c,
we immediately get 0 < c−v < c−av < c−av. As a result, both the F5-set and
F4-set are subsets of the subspace of a positive reelection premium, rB>0 (the north-
west triangle on Figure 3). From Assumption 3, we also know that the F1-set implies
a negative reelection premium (the south-east triangle on Figure 3).
Recalling once again that the boundaries are deﬁned by r = r1−r0 = (c−av)/B,
and identifying that F4∪F5 lies above the zero-premium line r = 0, whereas F1 lies
below the line, it is now straightforward to analyze the effects of parametric changes
in c and B:
(i) An increase in the project cost the politician pays shifts boundaries upwards, to
the higher levels of reelection difference. With a larger cost, a reelection difference
(andreelectionpremium)mustgrowtoinduceswitchtoamorepro-fundingchoice.
A consequence is that the F5-set of overfunding pooling equilibria shrinks, and the
F1-set of no-funding pooling equilibria enlarges.
(ii) An increase in the reelection value decreases the absolute values of the boundaries.
A larger value of the reelection thus makes politicians’ funding more sensitive to
the absolute value of the reelection difference. The boundaries move towards the
zero-premium line, r =0, hence both sets of pooling equilibria, F1-set and F5-set,
get larger.
Our main interest rests with the semi-separating equilibria. Proposition 2 deli-
vers two important comparative statics results regarding these equilibria. First, minor
changes in the boundaries that keep the cutoff value ˆ r within the F4-set are irrelevant,
as they do not change the voter’s utility. Although minor changes in parameters c or B
change the equilibrium cutoff value ˆ r, this is fully offset by change in efforts. Second,
by manipulating boundaries such that the F4-set is infeasible (hence Assumption 2 no
longer holds), it is possible to get rid of the wasteful spending for good. The intu-
itive argument by Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) on uselessness of accountability
is thus perfectly valid unless the voter can use relatively harsh punishments for funding
in terms of extra project cost, and/or reduction the value of reelection.
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Proposition 2 (Neutrality and cornering-out). (i) Anychangeinprojectcostcpaidby
the politician or reelection rent B received by the reelected politician that preserves
the existence of semi-separating equilibria, ∃(r0,r0+ ˆ r) ∈ F4, does not change ef-
forts (i(ˆ r),I) or funding choices of the politicians, hence the voter’s utility remains
unchanged in the semi-separating equilibrium.
(ii) By imposing a sufﬁciently high project cost c or sufﬁciently low reelection rent B,
the F4 and F5-sets become infeasible, hence all F4 and F5-equilibria disappear.
As a corollary, there exist pairs (c,B) that induce a corner F3-equilibrium with
efﬁcient funding choice of both types, a(v) = a(v) = 0,a(v) = a(v) = 1.
Proof. Part (i) (Neutrality): Funding choices are constant since a sufﬁcient and ne-
cessary condition for a set of semi-separating equilibria is preserved. Next, Propo-
sition 1 proves that each semi-separating equilibrium is characterized by a reelec-
tion difference equal to the cutoff value, ˆ r, where the voter is indifferent over types,
u(ˆ r)−u(ˆ r) = I(v−v)+v−c−i(ˆ r)(v−c) = 0. Since I = y−1
i (a(v−v)) is con-
stant in r, and the cost c in the argument of the voter’s utilities are constant (voter’s,
not politicians’) costs, we have to have that also i(ˆ r) must remain unchanged, even
if ˆ r changed. With all arguments constant, also u(ˆ r) and u(ˆ r) are constant, and the
expected voter’s utility is constant (equal zero).
Part (ii) (Cornering-out): From Table 1, both F4 and F5-sets are infeasible if F4-set
is not feasible for the maximal r = 1, i.e. if av−c+B < 0. In such a case, the re-
election rates (r0,r1) = (0,1) that are equivalent to the maximal reelection difference
r = 1 belong into the F3-set, where funding choices of the politicians are efﬁcient.
In the F3-set, as known from proof to Proposition 1 and Table 3, the voter strictly
prefers (r0,r1) = (0,1), hence doesn’t deviate and this pair of reelection rates is an
equilibrium. 2
Another interesting property of boundary manipulations is an equilibrium switch.
Consider a decrease in c or increase in B that enlarges F5-set such that the pre-change
reelection rates characterized by the initial ˆ r become now elements of the enlarged
F5-set. Then, if voters are less ﬂexible in changing the actions than politicians (e.g.,
there might be a coordination problem in the group of representative voters), and do
not adapt their reelection rates, these become equilibrium rates, but now of a pooling
equilibrium, not a semi-separating equilibrium. Although semi-separating equilibria
with a new (lower) cutoff values will be feasible, they need not to be played.
To summarize the entire section on Bayesian equilibria of the baseline game: (i)
Multiple equilibria exist. (ii) Wasteful spending preserves only in a weak equilibrium,
where the voter is indifferent over types, hence H-politician doesn’t gain any electoral
advantage. (iii) Minor incentives do not change the politicians’ strategies: As long
as the wasteful signaling equilibrium exists, the levels of politicians’ efforts cannot be
changed. (iv) The only way to remedy wasteful spending is to impose sufﬁciently large
incentives that completely eliminate wasteful signaling in the range of best responses
of the politicians.
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4. Wasteful aid control
4.1 Benevolent controller
In this section, we restrict ourselves to the state aid control imposed on the interior
semi-separating F4-equilibrium. Although it might be interesting to look on the aid
control as a device to resolve multiplicity of equilibria or eliminate total overfunding
in F5-pooling equilibrium, our main goal is to show that state aid control is often
impossible as a remedy to wasteful signalling, and if possible, it is not desirable given
the adverse effects on politician’ effort.
Setting an objective of the controller is of course critical to modeling aid control.
We restrict ourselves to a benevolent state aid controller, who maximizes utility of
the representative voter. This limits the analysis to essentially a normative, second-
best problem. Motivation is twofold: (i) If the optimal aid control under a benevolent
controller is no control, then — except for a dynamic inconsistency problem — a con-
strained or biased policy-maker should not be able to deliver a better outcome. There-
fore, optimality of no-control should be robust to more realistic objectives. (ii) To re-
veal the project type or politician type, information must be sought at a cost. In a group
of representative voters, this costly information is thus a public good. Hence, it is in-
teresting to see what happens if the representative voter can instal a citizen-candidate,
sharing policy preferences of the representative voter, and optimally providing this
public good through tax revenues.
The state-aid control is meaningful only if a project is funded, i.e. for nodes where
a = 1. To solve for equilibria in these nodes, we use that in a F4-equilibrium, it is
common knowledge that H-politician funds all projects and L-politicians funds only
i(ˆ r) < 1 projects. This allows the controller to use equivalently a posterior probability
of having H-politician, p, or a posterior probability of having a proﬁtable project,
q(p). Updating posteriors on the politician type is thus instrumental only to updating
posteriors on the project type; if H-politician is more likely, then a proﬁtable project is
less likely:
q(p) := pI+1−p,q0(p) = I−1 < 0.
We introduce a benevolent aid controller as follows: If funding takes place, an
extra Stage 5 with the controller’s node follows. The controller starts with a posterior
belief on the project quality q(p1), and decides only on investing into a single costly
signal. The signal is either direct (on the project quality, Sv ∈ {v,v}), or indirect (on
the politician quality, Sa ∈ {a,a}). Once a signal is observed, the controller updates
his or her belief on the proﬁtable project type to either q or q. (For convenience, we
keep this notation irrespective of the signal type; it will be clear in the context which
signal type is being examined.) Lastly, the controller approves funding of the project
with probability f ∈ [0,1].
Theoretically, we could allow the controller lead the game and make an investiga-
tion with an observable commitment to the approval rate f prior the reelection stage.
This would nevertheless complicate the analysis, because the reelection rates would
have to reﬂect the observed actions of the controller. The voter would not only use the
approval rate as a signal, but possibly would also infer realization of the signal, since
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 1 105M. Gregor, D. Roh´ aˇ c
the voter and the controller share the objectives, and their information sharing should
be trivial. In this extension of the strategy set of the voter, the controller’s action would
become a direct tool of domestic politics. At this moment, however, we are not inte-
rested in the interplay between domestic accountability and the control of an external
authority, albeit it creates a direct avenue for further research.
The approval rate f depends only on whether it is better to accept a lottery over
payoffs(v−c,v−c)withprobabilities(q,1−q)orremaininthestatusquowithcertain
zero payoff. In other words, the controller is minimizing the expected loss of the Type
I and Type II errors (approve a wasteful project, ban a proﬁtable project). Given that
the expected payoff is linear in q, this clearly yields a step-wise correspondence f(q),
where f(q) = 1 if q > q∗, f(q) ∈ [0,1] if q = q∗, and f(q) = 0 if q < q∗. The threshold





Next, it is convenient to deﬁne a worthless signal. A signal s is called worthless
if f(q(p1)) = f(q) = f(q). Such a signal has no value since any realization of the
signal leads to only small changes in beliefs that keep the initial approval rate f(q(p1))
unchanged, irrespective of the realization of the signal. A worthless signal will not be
purchased by the controller.
A ﬁnal interesting point is that for the F4-equilibrium without aid control, it is ex
ante socially optimal to approve the funded project, f(q(p1)) = 1. Using property of




















As a result, q(p1)>q∗, from which f(q(p1))=1 clearly follows. In other words, a
controller without a signal, like a voter, is willing to approve any funded project. Thus,
the introduction of a controller affects wasteful spending if and only if the controller is
able to get extra information, and the signal is strong enough not to be worthless.
4.2 Indirect signals
Suppose a signal about the politician’s type Sa ∈ {a,a}, true with probability s ∈
[1/2,1], and false with probability 1−s,
s := Pr(Sa = a|a = a) = Pr(Sa = a|a = a).
For the purpose of Proposition 3, we introduce the controller’s updated beliefs over
H-politician, p and p:








106 AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 1The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control
Applying the q(p) function, we may write q = q(p) and q = q(p).
Proposition 3 (No indirect control). Indirect signal Sa is worthless for all s ∈[1/2,1].
The controller never purchases such signals and approves all funded projects with
probability f(q(p1)) = 1.
Proof. We aim to show that q ≥ q(p1) ≥ q > q∗. Observing Sa = a implies p ≤ p1,
hence q ≥ q(p1). This leads to f(q) = 1, because ˜ q > q∗. Observing Sa = a implies
p ≥ p1, and q ≤ q(p1). Hence, there is a chance that q falls below the critical level
q∗. Since q0(p) < 0, it is sufﬁcient to examine only the extreme of p = 1, which
corresponds to the extreme (truth-revealing) signal s = 1. Imposing into q(p), we
have q = q(1) = I.
Consider now the property of the cutoff value ˆ r that characterizes the F4-equilibri-
um. Here, the expected payoff from having H-politician is equal to that of L-politician,
and both are positive:
I(v−c)+(1−I)(v−c) = i(ˆ r)(v−c) > 0
We use positivity of the left-hand side to rewrite




With q > q(p1), the situation is simple since f(q) = 1. To sum up, f(q(p1)) = f(q) =
f(q) = 1. The signal is indeed worthless and is never purchased. 2
4.3 Direct signals
Alternatively, assume that the controller can purchase a symmetric signal Sv ∈ {v,v},
true with probability s, and false with probability 1−s,
s := Pr(Sv = v|v = v) = Pr(Sv = v|v = v).
The updates on the proﬁtable project type are now redeﬁned as follows:








Now, the key difference to the case of indirect signal is that the range of posteriors
q and q for different strength of the signal s is not [I,1], but includes an entire unit
interval [0,1]. This becomes evident once we calculate the realizations of a perfect sig-
nal, s = 1: (q,q) = (0,1). For optimistic realizations of the signals (those increasing
q), ranges of both types of signal are identical, [q(p1),1], and signaling works iden-
tically. A signal of one type can always be replaced by a feasible signal of the other





⊂[0,q(p1)]. Signals over the project type are thus more informative than
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Figure 4. The updates q and q for direct and indirect signals of various precision
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signals over the politician type. Unlike a signal on the politician type, a signal over the
project type is not always worthless, i.e. may revert the approval rate f(q(p1)) = 1 to
f(q) = 0. Figure 4 illustrates.





The threshold level of s∗ allows for an interesting interpretation. The denominator
comprises a sum of all net beneﬁts related to a correct choice. It is a weighted sum
of the net beneﬁt of a correct approval and the net beneﬁt of a correct ban, where the
weights are pre-signal beliefs on the project type, i.e. q(p1). The nominator is just the
ﬁrsttypeofnetbeneﬁts, relatedtothecorrectapproval. Thecriticalratioisthusthepre-
signal relative importance of approval. Clearly, if q(p1) is large, and the controller is
optimistic prior obtaining a signal, the signal must be very strong to temper optimism.
With optimism, only very precise signals are purchased.
4.4 The game with aid control
The no-control F4-equilibrium is control-proof as long as the signal is worthless for
q(p1). Thus, it remains to analyze cases with sufﬁciently strong signals, s > s∗. We
proceed by backward induction, considering the controller’s choice.
A signal that is not worthless yields f(q) = 0 < 1 = f(q). Up the game tree, this
is anticipated by the politicians. We introduce the anticipated approval rates for each
value of the project:
Pr(f = 1|v = v) = Pr(Sv = v|v = v) = 1−s
Pr(f = 1|v = v) = Pr(Sv = v|v = v) = s
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Sinceeachpoliticianobservestheprojecttype, heorsheanticipatestype-dependent
approval rates s and 1−s. Funding choices of the politicians rewrite into
(1−s)(av−c)+r1B ≥ r0B,
s(av−c)+r1B ≥ r0B,
where a ∈ {a,a}. Since s ≤ 1 and 1−s < 1, the boundaries between F1 to
F5-sets now shrink towards the zero premium line, r = 0. Interestingly, a drop in the
approval rate has a similar effect on the individual boundaries as an increase in the
reelection rent B.
It is necessary to analyze whether the boundaries preserve their ordering so that
the structure of the optimal funding choices as in Table 2 remains unchanged. This is
a relevant concern given that the approval rates differ, 1−s < s, which stems from
s > s∗ > 1/2. We require
(1−s)(c−av) > (1−s)(c−av) > s(c−av) > s(c−av).
The left and right inequalities hold by standard assumptions, so the only issue is if
(1−s)(c−av)>s(c−av). By Assumption 3, we have av−c<v−c<0<av−c,
which secures that the middle inequality holds for any signal.
In a semi-separating equilibrium with aid control, effort levels will differ from the
equilibrium without control. For H-politician, denote the new optimal value I(s), to




To see that I(s) < I, notice the argument of a monotonic increasing function
y−1








i {a(v−v)} = I
I(1) = y−1
i {av−c} < y−1
i {a(v−v)} = I





At last, we can proceed to the welfare evaluation of the state aid control. Recall that
in any F4-equilibrium, expected payoffs from both politician types are equal, hence we
may write the voter’s expected payoff in two equivalent ways:
w(s) := sI(s)(v−c)+(1−I(s))(1−s)(v−c)
w(s) := si(s)(v−c)
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These compare with the voter’s expected payoff under the case of no control:
u(ˆ r) = I(v−c)+(1−I)(v−c)
u(ˆ r) = i(ˆ r)(v−c)
The voter’s indifference in F4-equilibrium implies w(s)=w(s), and u(ˆ r)=u(ˆ r).
From comparison of w(s) with u(ˆ r), it can be seen that aid control combines three
effects, one positive and two negative. The ﬁrst beneﬁcial effect is diligence, since
only 1−s wasteful projects are funded. The other side of the coin is overcautiousness,
since some proﬁtable projects (again share 1−s) are not approved for funding. The
third effort is lower effort of H-politician, I(s)<I, hence the pool of projects proposed
by H-politician deteriorates.
The tradeoff may lead to welfare superiority of no-control regime as well as supe-
riority of the aid control regime. The following two examples illustrate two extreme
cases: In Example 1, no-control regime dominates any control regime. In Example 2,
both extreme control regimes – one with a useless signal (s = 1/2) and one with a
perfect signal (s = 1) – dominate the no-control regime.
Example 1. Assume v = 0 < 1 = c < 5 = v. Let y(i) = −i−log(1−i), where for
i∈(0,1), yi =i/(1−i)>0,yii =(1−i)−2 >0, and the inverse marginal cost function
is increasing and within the unit interval, y−1
i (x) = x/(x+1) ∈ [0,1]. Let a = 1/2,
so that I(1) > I(1/2). This implies that argmaxs w(s) = 1. The efforts are I = 5/7 >
3/5 = I(1). The expected payoffs are u(ˆ r) = 90/35 > 84/35 = w(1).
Example 2. Assume v=0<4=c<5=v. The cost function again satisﬁes y−1
i (x)=
x/(x+1). Let a =9/10. The efforts are I =9/11>I(1/2)=9/13>I(1)=1/3. The
expected payoffs are w(1/2) = 9/13 > w(1) = 1/3 > u(ˆ r) = 1/11.
We identify a sufﬁcient condition for the no-control regime to dominate any control
regime. This will be useful for the ensuing discussion on the (non)desirability of state
aid control.
Proposition 4 (No direct control). Suppose that F4-equilibria with wasteful spending
as signaling exist in regimes with and without aid control. In these equilibria, the
regime of no state aid control involves a larger expected payoff of the voter than any
regime with state aid control, u(ˆ r) > maxw(s),s ∈ [1/2,1], if
av−av > max{av−c; a
2(v−v)}.
Proof. First, we bind w(s) from above. The effort ˜ I := maxs∈[1/2,1]I(s) = y−1
i {max
[av−c; a
2(v−v)]} is the maximal effort of H-politician under the case with control.
For the voter, the best lottery (given constant effort) in the case with control is s = 1,
hence we can set upper bound on the expected payoff w(s) as ˜ I(v−c) ≥ w(s).
Second, a sufﬁcient condition for the strict dominance of no-control is to ensure
u(ˆ r) = u(ˆ r) = i(ˆ r)(v−c) > ˜ I(v−c) ≥ w(s). This is equivalent to i(ˆ r) > ˜ I, or
av−c+ ˆ rB > max{av−c; a
2(v−v)}.
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Using (r0,r1) ∈ F4, we establish that for the case of no control c−av ≤ B(ˆ r).
This creates a lower bound on i(ˆ r), which can now be compared with ˜ I,
av−c+ ˆ rB ≥ av−av > max{av−c; a
2(v−v).
Thus, a condition av−av > max{av−c; a
2(v−v) is sufﬁcient to imply i ≥ Imax,
and u(ˆ r) ≥ w(s). 2
As the ﬁnal step, we use the sufﬁcient condition for explicit comparative statics of
the optimality of no control. The condition rewrites into two subconditions,
av−av−av+c ≥ 0,
2av−av−av ≥ 0.
It is easy to deduce that the two conditions are more likely satisﬁed, the higher is
c, the lower is v, the higher is a, and the lower is a. To interpret: Aid control is not
desirable when (i) the project cost is large, (ii) losses of the unproﬁtable project go up,
and (iii) the politicians are relatively homogenous.
5. Conclusion
We have analyzed a signaling game where competent politicians strategically use state
aid to manifest competence. We focused entirely on interior equilibria. In the regime of
no state aid control, as introduced by Dewatripont and Seabright (2006), we conjecture
the following: (i) Multiple equilibria exist. In overfunding pooling equilibria, politi-
cians fund all projects, hence spending cannot signal competence. In zero-funding
pooling equilibria, nothing is funded, hence a loss entails underfunding rather than
wasteful funding. (ii) Wasteful spending preserves in a weak equilibrium, where the
voter is indifferent over types, hence electoral advantage of the high-type politician is
completely wiped out. (iii) Marginal incentives do not change the politicians’ strate-
gies: As long as the wasteful signaling equilibrium still exists, the politicians’ levels
of effort are unchanged. (iv) The only way to remedy wasteful spending is to impose
sufﬁciently large incentives that completely eliminate wasteful signaling. This also
eliminates overfunding pooling equilibria and introduces efﬁcient funding choices of
all politicians. If that is achieved by means of a lower reelection rent, then in contrast
to compensating the project cost, it is also possible to eliminate underfunding equilib-
ria and install a unique equilibrium. Hence, a change in the reelection rent is a better
tool than a compensation of the project cost. In other words, the disciplinary incentives
should be future-oriented.
In the regime with aid control, our results are as follows: (i) The benevolent con-
troller who resorts to extra information on the politician’s type (indirect signal) will
approve all projects as if having no signal, hence the signal turns to be useless. (ii)
Information on the project type (direct signal) may be also useless, if the signal is not
strong enough. (iii) With signals that are strong enough, effort levels — given con-
stant reelection premium — decrease. As a result, the existence of aid control brings a
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tradeoff combining three effects: diligence, overcautiousness, and deterioration of the
pool of funded projects. (iv) We identify a sufﬁcient condition for the optimal state aid
control to be no control, regardless of the precision of the signal. The absence of state
aid control is socially desirable when the project cost is large, losses of the unproﬁtable
project are high, and the politicians are relatively symmetric.
To sum up, in this setup the case for pro-active state aid control of a benevolent
supranational authority is limited. Marginal changes in politicians’ incentives do not
work either. Only a major reform in terms of much larger internalization of the project
cost, or much lower reelection rent, is an unambiguous way to discipline wasteful
spending as pre-electoral signalling.
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